United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit



APPENDIX

In The

United States Court of Appeals

For The Second Circuit

SALVATORE ALBANESE,


Petitioner - Appellant,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

APPELLANT'S APPENDIX



Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant 747 Third Avenue New York, New York 10017 (212) 421 - 1993



JEROME LEWIS On the Brief

(7051)

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DOCKET ENTRIES

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Docket Entries

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DATE	FILINGS—PROCEEDINGS					
12-4-25	NOTICE OF MOTION FILED FOR CREDIT TOWARD THE SENTENCE IMPOSED OF PRETRIAL CONFINEMENT TIME (Re: 60-CR-147)	1	-55			
地野	Before DOOLING, J. Motion for credit toward sentence, etc.,					
12:X-13	argued. MOTION DENIED.					
1-13	BY DOOLING, J. ORDER FILED (endorsed upon the back of motion papers) ORDERED that the motion is in all respects DENIED.					
	(See Order)		1. 1.			
12-7-73	Notice of Appeal filed.	2				
7-7-7	Copy of Notice of appeal was on this day mailed to Clerk, U.S.	-				
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7-38	Instructions re preparation of record, etc., were on this day	mille				
	mailed to H. ELLIOT WALES, FSQ., 747 Third Ave., N. Y., N. Y. 10017					
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

- against -

SALVATORE ALBANESE,

Defendant.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Docket #73 C 1789

- against -

SALVATORE ALBANESE,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Defendant. :

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SIR:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the defendant SALVATORE ALBANESE hereby appeals to the United States Court of Appeals from the order of the United States District Court, dated December 4, 1973, denying his motion for jail time credit toward the service of the sentence.

Yours, etc.,

Dated: New York, N.Y. December 7, 1973

H. ELLIOT WALES Counsel for Defendant

Albanese

747 Third Avenue

New York, N.Y. 10017

421-1993

To: CLERK OF THE COURT

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

NOTICE OF MOTION AND SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT (Filed December 7, 1973) EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

- against -

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

73 CIVIL 1789

60 OR 147

(JFD)

SALVATORE ALBANESE, : NOTICE OF MOTION FOR

CREDIT TOWARD THE SENTENCE

Defendant. : IMPOSED OF PRETRIAL CON-

FINEMENT TIME

SIR:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that upon the judgment of conviction and sentence, dated June 6, 1969, upon the transcript of proceedings of the sentencing of that day, upon the annexed affidavit of H. ELLIOT WALES, and upon the supporting letters from the United States Bureau of Prisons, the undersigned will apply to this Court, before District Judge John F. Dooling, Jr., on the 4% day of December, 1973, at such date and time as he shall set forth, for an order, pursuant to 28 USC 2255, 18 USC 3568, and 18 USC 3651, directing that the defendant be given credit for the pretrial period of confinement (March 7, 1960 to May 20, 1963 three years, 2 months, 13 days - 1170 days)toward the sentence of five . years probation which this Court imposed on June 6, 1969, and which defendant began to serve on January 18, 1972.

Dated: New York, N.Y. November 30, 1973

TO: CLERK OF THE COURT

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

UNITED STATES PROBATION OFFICE

H. ELLIOT Counsel for Defendant 747 Third Avenue New York, N.Y. 10017

421-1993

Notice of Motion and Supporting Affidavit of Counsel

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, :

60 CR 147

- against -

(JFD)

SALVATORE ALBANESE, : COUNSEL'S AFFIDAVIT IN

SUPPORT OF APPLICATION

Defendant.

STATE OF NEW YORK

) SS.:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

H. ELLIOT WALES, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

I am counsel for the defendant SALVATORE ALBANESE, and submit this affidavit, together with the supporting documents, in support of his application for credit for time served toward the sentence of probation imposed by this Court on June 6, 1969.

Perhaps this Court will recall that Albanese was one of the defendants in the renowned Persico case, of which the fifth trial was presided by Your Honor.

On June 6, 1969 this Court imposed a sentence of probation in the term of five years upon Albanese. Simultaneously the Court imposed a ten year prison sentence upon him, but suspended the execution of that sentence.

In 1970 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction (425 F2d 1375), and later that year the Supreme Court denied certionari. 400 US 869.

Notice of Motion and Supporting Affidavit of Counsel

Albanese began service of the sentence of probation on January

18, 1972. According to the records of the Probation Department, he

must remain under supervision until January 18, 1977, when the five

year probation period expires. Albanese has already served more than

one year and ten months of that sentence. It is his position that he is

toward his sentence, he will then have served the entire five year sentence,

entitled to credit for pretrial confinement for a period of three years,

two months, and thirteen days. If he is given credit for that time

and would be entitled to discharge at this point.

The attached letters from the United States Bureau of Prisons

(Federal House of Detention, New York City and of the Penitentiary at

Atlanta, Georgia) show that Albanese was confined continuously with regard
to this matter from March 7, 1960 until May 20, 1963 - a period of
three years, two months, thirteen days - or 1170 days. The record shows

Albanese was arrested on March 7, 1960, and held continuously at the
Federal Detention Headquarters at West Street until November 14, 1961
when he was transferred to the Penitentiary at Atlanta, Georgia for
service of the sentence which had been imposed upon him on October 31,
1961 by the late Judge Abruzzo. Subsequently Albanese was returned to
West Street from Atlanta on October 3, 1962, and he remained at West
Street until May 20, 1963, when he was released from federal custody.

In imposing sentence this Court stated (R. 57):

"THE COURT: It is my intention to impose and suspend the execution of the sentence of imprisonment and accord you the maximum probation term. I understand your State probation is now over.

Notice of Motion and Supporting Affidavit of Counsel

MR. ALBANESE: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: On the jury's verdict of guilty to Counts I and 2 of the Indictment, you, Salvatore Albanese, are committed to the Attorney General or his duly authorized representative who shall designate the place of confinement for ten years. Execution of the sentence is suspended and you are placed on probation for five years under the conditions provided by the standing Order of the Court."

In imposing sentence, this Court did not state that it was giving Albanese credit for the period of pretrial confinement. In fact the Court was very firm in declaring that it was imposing the maximum probation term.

In contrast, in imposing sentence upon co-defendant Hugh McIntosh, this Court stated specifically that under Section 3568, it was intending that McIntosh should have credit against his sentence for the time spent in pretrial confinement (R. 52):

"THE COURT: That, under Section 3568 is, as I understand the law, a credit against the sentence, and it is so intended."

To be sure this Court did discuss with counsel the period of time which Albanese did spend in federal custody in lieu of bail and in State custody for service of a prison sentence (R.55-56):

"THE COURT: Since the commission of this offense, you have served a term of imprisonment and have been released on parole?

MR. ALBANESE: Yes.

THE COURT: Has that parole been completed?

MR. ALBANESE: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And in this case, you had been held for want of bail?

MR. ALBANESE: Yes, your Honor.

Notice of Motion and Supporting Affidavit of Counsel

THE COURT: As I recall, for a substantial period.

MR. ALBANESE: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Over three years?

MR. ALBANESE: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Mr. Albanese, is there any reason, any just cause, why sentence should not be imposed?

MR. ALBANESE: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Is there anything you wish to say on your own behalf with respect to sentence?

MR. ALBANESE: No, just that I did another three years extra on my State case because of this.

THE COURT: This was treated as a parole violation?

MR. ALBANESE: Yes, your Honor. I was supposed to finish up in '63 and I didn't finish up until '67.

THE COURT: And all of this since 1960?

MR. ALBANESE: Yes.

THE COURT: It is my intention to impose and suspend the execution of the sentence of imprisonment and accord you the maximum probation term. I understand your State probation is now over.

MR. ALBANESE: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: On the jury's verdict of guilty to Counts l and 2 of the Inductment, you, Salvatore Albanese, are committed to the Attorney General or his duly authorized representative who shall designate the place of confinement for ten years. Execution of the sentence is suspended and you are placed on probation for five years under the conditions provided by the standing Order of the court."

On the other hand the Court never did state that it was giving Albanese credit for such time. In fact if the Court really wished the credit provision of In USC 3568 to be applicable, this Court could have imposed a prison sentence of almost four years on count 1, and limited the sentence of pro-

Notice of Motion and Supporting Affidavit of Counsel bation to count 2. In that event Section 3568 would have given Albanese the necessary credit so that he would not have had to serve a day toward an imposed sentence of almost four years.

It is our position that Albanese is entitled to credit of 1170 days toward the only sentence of "custody" imposed - the five year probation sentence. As five years is the maximum probation period which can be imposed, it cannot be presumed that the District Court gave him credit toward that sentence of probation for his pretrial confinement puriod. 18 USC 3651. Actually Section 3568 Title 18, U.S. Code, is ambiguous, and doesn't fully answer the issue posed. While the section states that the Attorney General shall give credit for any days spent in custody in connection with the offense for which sentence was imposed, the section states that the credit shall be given "toward service of his sentence". The section does not state whether it is applicable only to a prison sentence, or whether it equally applies to a sentence of probation. Likewise the legislative history sheds no light at all on this subject. See Bail Reform Act of 1966, especially section 4 of that act, referred to, but not discussed at 1966 US Code Congressional and Administrative News, pages 2293, 2294, 2297, 2306, 2310.

In addition none of the reported court opinions discusses this very problem.

The record shows that for several reasons (either articulated or not articulated), the District Court did not wish to Impose a sentence of imprisonment upon Albanese. Perhaps the Court was motivated by the age of the case, or perhaps by the lesser culpability of the defendant. Perhaps

Notice of Motion and Supporting Affidavit of Counsel the Court was influenced by the fact that Albanese had since served a State prison sentence for the very same transgression. In any event, the Court clearly did not want to see Albanese returned to prison. On the other hand the Court's decision just could not erase the effect of section 3568, nor can it easily wipe out the total of 1170 days which Albanese served in federal institutions. There just is no reason in policy or law why only a person actually in prison should get credit for time served, and a person on probation should not be so credited. Actually a sentence of probation involves the element of "custody" - the probation is under the continuous supervision of the Probation Department, and must account to the Probation Department and to the District Court for any transgressions. He is subject to having his probation revoked, and a prison sentence imposed, for the violation of any terms and conditions of probation. Furthermore he is strictly accountable to the Probation Office for all his acts, and is prohibited from doing many things which are open to those who are not on probation. As such the Courts have uniformly considered a sentence of probation as one involving some degree of "custody". As such it is appropriate that Albanese receive credit for his pre-sentence confinement toward this sentence of custody which the Court imposed. As the Court imposed the maximum permissible sentence of probation, it cannot be urged that the Court took into consideration the earlier period of confinement, and subtracted it from the period of probation imposed. Nor does the record support the argument that the District Court gave Albanese credit towards a sentence of imprisonment which it would have imposed, but did not impose. Obviously the Court did not suspend the execution of the ten year prison sentence because of Albanese's pretrial confinement.

Notice of Motion and Supporting Affidavit of Counsel 10a Certainly the Court did not intend to give him ten years credit for three years confinement. Furthermore the Court did not seem particularly concerned about the exact number of years or month och Albanese served—either in federal or state institutions.

The record clearly shows that the District Court did not wish to impose a sentence of imprisonment, and so was not concerned with the details of any other confinement. As such Albanese is entitled to credit toward the only sentence imposed - the one of probation.

I submit the entire transcript of all the defendants that day (68 pages), but remind the Court that I have alerted it to the only relevant pages.

I request the opportunity to orally argue this motion, at my time convenient to the Court.

FILLIOT WALES

Sworn to before me this

30th day of November, 1973

COMMISSIONER OF DEEDS

CITY OF NEW YORK NO. 4-652 Sustificate Filed in New York County

Dawnission Expires December 1, 1974

TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL ARGUMENT DECEMBER 4, 1973 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA -against- : SALVATORE ALBANESE, 60-CR147 Defendant. : United States Courthouse Brooklyn, New York December 4, 1973 Before: HONORABLE JOHN F. DOOLING, JR., U.S.D.J. come is to be to the gree sulling.

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EMAMUEL KARR OFFICIAL COURT MEPORT

Appearances:

ROBERT A. MORSE, ESQ. United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York

BY: JAMES DOUGHERTY, ESQ.
Assistant United States Attorney

H. ELLIOT WALES, ESQ. Attorney for Defendant

. 10

THE CLERK: United States of America vs.
Salvatore Albanese, defendant, Notion for
Credit Towards the Sentence.

THE COURT: Now, do you want to explain
it for the record, for me and for Mr. Dougherty?

MR. WALES: I assume your Honor read
the papers.

THE COURT: Oh, yes.

MR. WALES: Very good.

This is an application for the Court to allow credit of approximately three years, two months, in other words, 1170 days of actual pretrial confinement towards the sentence of five years of probation which the Court did impose. The Court imposed the sentence in 1969 of five years probation, and Mr. Albanese began service of that sentence approximately one year and almost 11 months ago, it was in January of 1972, according to the Probation Department records. He has a five-year period of probation which goes from January '72 to January '77. Obviously, we cannot expect the Probation Department to make the decision in this matter, so of course we have to come before you, Judge Dooling, the sentencing

judge, for the question of credit for the time.

If our position is correct, then he has served the sentence in toto and would be entitled to a discharge, and so our application is in the nature of a 2255 asking for his --

THE COURT: Or it is an application in the nature of a writ of habeus corpus to discharge him from the symbols of custody implicit in probation.

MR. WALES: Well, we will say it is more than symbols, your Honor, and I think that will be an aspect of the argument.

Anyway, we asking the Court to give him credit for it in such that he would --

THE COURT: What I am concerned with,
Mr. Wales, is the question of jurisdiction here
and whether technically Mr. Albanese should not
be the respondent to a writ or something of that
sort. That is all I was concerned about.

MR. WALES: Of course, I served the papers upon the United States Probation Office, and I should say I spoke to Steve Rachmil when I was first retained to first of all find out certain facts in terms of when he was due, when he

started probation, when it was expired. Mr. Rachmil was aware of the fact that I was making this application, Albanese had told him, and Mr. 5 Rachmil said, of course as I expected him to say, "Well, obviously, we can't take a position on 6 it, whatever Judge Dooling says, we will abide by. Of course, we are not making any determination, our records show that he is going to be under our supervision until January '77, and he will be, unless some Court directs otherwise, 11 which of course is a fair presentation of his picture.

> So I think there is nothing that Mr. Rachmil and his office can do.

Obviously, we can only refer it to your Honor, and since your Honor is here in the same building, I don't think it presents any undue administrative problem.

THE COURT: No administrative, just technical problems.

MR. WALES: I think the Probation Office is the agent and arm of the Court in terms of supervising of men; obviously, judges themselves aren't going to supervise men on probation,

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for that they have a probation staff to do that particular work and to report to them if there are any problems and go to them for any Court Orders in a case involving revocation.

THE COURT: You see, if I understand the position that you take, when Mr. Albanese appeared for sentencing in 1969 he was asked and answered for present purposes truthfully that he had already served some three years on any time that might be imposed, that he had been custody for want of bail on the charge then before the Court for over three years, and I was informed also and knew from the supplement to the pre-sentence report that after he was released from custody on bail in the Persico case he was violated under State law and remitted until either his mandatory parole expiration date or until re-paroled, and that on sentence day he had either completed or was still under State parole supervision -- I think the latter, I am not sure; but that appears in the transcript because he was aware of it, and I know that Spero was under parole supervision -- I can't remember as to Mr. Albanese, perhaps he had completed.

MR. WALES: I believe he did.

I don't believe there is anything in the transcript on that score.

THE COURT: No, except the negative, I mean it is sort of negative on the point, but the fact is that he must have completed it because it was a rather old sentence, as I recall.

Now, the sentence imposed was a sentence of 10 years under Section 1951, where the maximum is 20 years, and on the expiration or execution of that sentence the placing of the man on parole for five years, which is the maximum period of parole permitted by Section 3651.

Now, certainly it was my intention, if
lawful, that he should be under probationary
supervision for the whole of the five-year period.
The thought of the sentence was that he would
after the date of the commission of the offense
serve a healthy amount of time in prison, more
than a third of any sentence -- well, no, but
creeping up on the third of almost any sentence
which you could think of was appropriate for
him. He had a record as a second offender and
I at least thought that he stood in need of

supervision, having in mind particularly that this would help Mr. Albanese get out of the ugly little circle of perhaps which he had been in since 1959, and be out of it altogether. So that is what I had in mind.

Now, if I understand your contention here is that the sentence that was imposed and did not suspend is really a commitment, it is a commitment to the Eastern District of New York, let us say, under Governmental supervision, and he is therefore just as much entitled to a credit as in any other kind of commitment -- right?

MR. WALES: Right.

THE COURT: I had never thought of that
before and I don't know that there are any authorities on it, but I have a sneaking suspicion
that there are none because I know of your
diligence --

MR. WALES: Thank you.

THE COURT: (Continuing) -- and if there had been one I would have expected to hear about it in solid capitals, right?

MR. WALES: Thank you, I appreciate that.

THE COURT: So where are we?

Well, I suppose strictly we are under 3651, the first sentence of which -- and I think it is for us the critical one -- reads:

"Upon entering a judgment of conviction of any offense not punishable by death of life imprisonment, any court having jurisdiction to try offenses against the United States when satisfied that the ends of justice and the best interests of the public as well as the defendant will be served thereby may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as the Court deems best."

Then there is another sentence that is very important:

* * *

"The period of probation, together with any sentencing thereof, shall not exceed five years."

Now, I think that is the section we have to deal with.

Now, my own sense of it is this, that since probation -- oh, wait, we probably should look at 3658 together -- 3568, I'm sorry.

MR. WALES: 3568, right.

THE COURT: 3568 provides: "The sentence of imprisonment of any person convicted of an offense shall commence to run from the date on which such person is received at a penitentiary, reformatory or jail for service of such sentence."

Now, there is another sentence, the next sentence: "The Attorney General shall give any such person credit towards the service of his sentence for any days spent in custody in connection with the offense or acts for which sentence was imposed."

Now, I don't think the definitions count -well, the following paragraph has a phrasing in
it which covers part of the time served:

If any such person shall be committed to jail or other place of detention to await transportation to the place of which his sentence is to be served, his sentence shall commence to run from the date on which he is received at such jail or other place of detention."

Then it says in a separate paragraph:

"No sentence shall prescribe any other
method of computing the term."

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Now, I think those are the sections that we have to deal with.

Now, my sense of it is this, that Mr.

Albanese has a suspended sentence of ten years overhanging him or did have because of course if his probation has been successfully completed it no longer overhangs him, but as long as his term of probation continued that unexecuted sentence overhung him.

Now, had it come into execution by reason by his being in violation of his probation, and having been convicted of the violation, the sentence would have gone into effect at once unless reduced, and he would then have been entitled to a credit against it for all the time spent in prison, that is the 1,170, so that his actual commitment time would have been such that he would be at the point, practically, of parole eligible the minute the sentence came into execution, and in that sense the 1170 days are not wasted time.

Now, the other consideration that I think bears on this is not a technical one but derives from the sentencing which was a prison sentence

not imposed on him. He was the one who, according to the evidence, if believed, and the jury evidently believes material parts of it, at least enough to convict him, he was the one who both had been responsible for the custody of the revolver used, allegedly used in the hijacking and who under the planning on the night of July 27-28, 1959, went to the tenement house and retrieved the pistol from behind the radiator at Mr. Persico's direction, according to Mr. Vaccaro's testimony, and took it with him on the hijack, and the evidence was that a pistol was presented to Mr. Kennedy, the truck driver, when the Buick stopped the truck and he was removed from the truck by Mr. Albanese and Mr. Vaccaro and had been ridden around town for some time while Spero drove the truck away: So that was hardly a peripheral connection with it.

Mr. McIntosh received a nine-year sentence, which is apparently going to be adjusted later in the day, somehow, and I think probably that it would be difficult, strictly in terms of sentencing, to justify a lighter sentence for

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Mr. Albanese. Now, in imposing the 10-year 2 santence, the 10 years was, of course, to a 3 certain extent, and as a rule, well, sentence 4 was intended to simplify Mr. Albanese's problem 5 by giving him an enormous incentive to avoid 6 violation of probation. It, I think, is fair 7 to say, had a little extra in it, but very 8 little extra, I wanted it to be a rounded amount 9 but something where if anybody ever said to him, 10 "Come on, you can go along with this, this is 11 pretty safe," he would say, "Look, I have got 12 10 years hanging over my head; forget it." And 13 that is much easier to say than if it were 9 14 years or 8 years or 7 -- or 11 -- "I have 10 years 15 hanging over my head," et cetera. That was 16 intended to be his rule of life for the next 17 five years, and by that time I figured at least 18 his age, he had a wife and I think one or two 19 children, he ought to be in the clear and ready 20 to get to work. 21

At the time of sentencing he was still a big, strong-looking person, although the last time he saw him he looked awful.

Now, the reason sentence was suspended

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and he did not receive any term of imprisonment, as distinguished from KoIntosh, who did, and from Mr. Persico, who did, was that he had spent so much time in prison already on this and other counts that everything the prison could do for him had at least in theory been done, and while he had not been at liberty throughout, he had been at liberty for some considerable time --I can't be sure now, I think he had been at liberty for some years, if I am not mistaken --I am not too clear about that, time in the Persico case comes in such large gobs that you can't be sure.

For that reason, it seemed to mo that the idea of throwing him back to jail for this ancient offense was not indicated, nor was it indicated in the Spero case, he had done a long time in State Prison, perhaps some in Federal custody, but principally a long time in State Prison. It was just recently that he had been admitted to parole and was going to be subject to state parole supervision for another decade.

In his case, too, he was given a 10-year suspended sentence and placed on probation for

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the maximum probationary term. The thinking was that while Albanese had not done nearly so much time as Spero, he had done enough for sentencing purposes and could be treated on the same basis as Spero, to a degree.

Incaration for Spero would have been simply inhumane, he had done so much time since 1959, and I am quite uncertain as to when he committed the offense which resulted in his State imprisonment, but that was an ancient offense, too. So that was the thinking, in other words, the time spent in prison was very much taken into account in the shaping of the sentence.

(Continued on next page.)

EK: ss Reel 2

THE COURT: From these points of view, the inevitable conclusion today would be that he was not entitled, is not entitled to a credit against probation time unless the law mandates it because that would be wholly alien to the idea of the sentence.

Now as to whether the law mandates it, my conclusion on that would be that it definitely does not, that the language and structure of Section 3651 and 3568 are rather indicative that prison time for purposes of credit is radically distinguished from lime on probation. The abridgement of probation time is possible under the law, I believe --

MR. WALES: I think under 3653 it is, your Honor.

THE COURT: I am reasonably sure it is.

MR. WALBS: The first paragraph of 3653,

the Court can discharge a probationer at any time.

THE COURT: Section 3653 provides that when directed by the Court, "the probation officer shall report to the Court with a statement of the conduct of the probationer while on probation. The Court may thereupon discharge the probationer from

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further supervision and may terminate the probation against him, or may extend the probation, as shall seem advisable."

The practice in this district, at list, is that the County Court rarely does that on some motion, but it is not uncommon for the probation service to submit a report and suggest early termination of probation, but it is on its own motion.

So without further instruction, I would conclude that the motion must be denied.

I am sure it is appealable.

MR. WALES: Before I get to the appeals stage, perhaps I can convince you of one or two things:

I don't doubt, I don't quarrel with your
Honor for a minute in the terms of your thinking
process of how you today now relate what you did
and why you did it --

THE COURT: I should say by the way that these were enormously difficult sentences, as you can imagine from the background of the case and the fact that this was the third time the man had been sentenced.

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MR. WALES: I don't quarrel with your relating to me right now, your Honor, what went through your mind now, let us say, and in terms, in terms of doing what you did in this area, but I don't think that this is the end of the matter, perhaps it is the beginning of the matter, the end is: What does the record reveal, and I don't think the record reveals, your Honor, that your Honor took any of these things into consideration; perhaps they went on in the back of your mind when you imposed sentence upon Albanese that day, but I think the record is silent on that score, and I think that this application today has to be determined solely upon the record as if your Honor had no independent recollection of it: You have to read the record. If the record shows that you took that matter into consideration and you gave him credit for it or were you asked for credit by the section, then that would be one thing --

THE COURT: I think there is one thing
you leave out of you and that is that under Rule
35 there was a pre-sentence report available for
inspection, so that the pre-sentence report is
also a part of this --

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MR. WALES: Only to the extent --

THE COURT: (Continuing) and there is also, as you know, a recommendation from the probation office, my tentative sentence and the recommendations of the panel list, so that the record has both its transcript visibility and its submerged portions -- perhaps in total fairness to everybody concerned I ought to get that.

Do you want to do that.

MR. WALES: Well, no, your Honor, and it is not that I don't want to accept your offer, but I really feel --

THE COURT: I am just thinking in terms -well, I mean this can be a point of some interest
to the appellate court.

MALES: The point is that, your Honor, that I am not really interested, your Honor, and not because of lack of disrespect, but I don't think it is germane or material as to what the probation officer's report said or what the recommendation was or what members of his staff, what is germane and the only thing that is germane is what is there in the record at the time sentencing was imposed --

THE COURT: Just that is my point that be-

MR. WALES: I think it is Rule 32.

THE COURT: Rule 32?

MR. WALES: Which gives pre-sentence reports.

that that it isn't really possible to say that
the record is limited to the transcript because,
well, in 1969 so many lawyers started out by
saying, I know you have a full and adequate presentence report before you, only nowadays about
half of the time they say, I know that you have
a very full tendentious and inaccurate pre-sentence
report before you, and they take specific exception
to the assertions on page so and so, 1/ne so and
so, et cetera, and that is under Rule 32(c), particularly Subdivision 2. The pre-sentence report
is really part of the record.

MR. WALES: It is only to the extent of course that it is part of your Honor's thinking, obviously you have studied it and been guided by it.

THE COURT: The other thing that I have in

mind is that it is important I think whether the sentence imposed was inadvertent or advertent, and what I would suggest here is, as you can well imagine, that the sentences in this sort of thing were advertent sentences and not routine by any manner or means. The cases were fairly well known by that time.

MR. WALES: Let me state my position on that point:

My position would be that your Bonor has
the opportunity to read into the record such portions of the probation report as you wish and
announce as being quidelines for the imposition
of your sentence, so I say that when it comes to
reviewing, let us say, the affect of a sentence
in terms of whether a man gets certain credit or
doesn't get certain credits by the reason of the
operation of other statutes, that we have to
look to the record that was made, and after all,
the only way the law can really be guided is in
terms of records that are being made. Now obviously a defendant counsel has an opportunity to
make statements, defendants also, if they wish,
and when the Court imposes sentence it can, to the

extent it wishes, make reference to things which are in the probation report and which has guided him, and he can make reference to facts. Naybe there is something in the report which they reject, they don't wish to be guided by or they dismiss as being frivolous. But the Court can state exactly what motivates it to do what it does so it may become known and dealt with by the Justice Department or by another Judge or by the Court of Appeals. Certainly back in 1969 even perhaps we didn't have so much disclosure in pre-sentence reports to defendants' counsel as we have now, but there was nothing to stop any District Judge from reading a portion of it into the record and to say, I --

think decency and human consideration is a real reason for that, I never regard sentence as an occasion for some Pontius Pilate on the bench excoriate someone as a justification for wrapping him up for X years, the whole business of reciting the man's record in open Court even strips a man of his manlihood and decency and certainly not any part of the administration of justice. It was sort of disgusting and repellant to most people

brought up in Brooklyn having to read Judge
Liebowitz's repeated demigration of people in
Court, that is if they had any humanity in them.

MR. WALES: Of course here your Honor had the opportunity to do the opposite and to say --

THE COURT: I have to be consistent.

MR. WALES: What.

THE COURT: I have to be consistent.

MR. WALES: You could have said, I'm giving him credit because I'm taking into consideration certain things. As I say, your Honor has the right and the power and the opportunity to read into the record that which you wish to read into the record or to state what you did and why you did it.

THE COURT: That is right, and there is certainly intimation in recent Court of Appeals' cases, they said that in all of these things done, no matter what it is, decency calls for certain things.

MR. WALES: But your Honor did not do it in this case.

THE COURT: No.

MR. WALES: I am not going to quarrel with

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your policy, but I suggest this to your Honor now that in determining whether Albanese has any rights under any of this statute for purpose of credit that all we can really look to is the record: I don't think it is for us to go back to the District Court and have to interview the Judge or question him informally to find out what motivated him or what his recollections are as of that time. I think the only proper way, as lawyers, that we can do it is to go to the record and see what the record says, for better or for worse. If the record shows that credit was given and that either lip service or full effect was given to that Section 3568, then that is fine, that is one thing; on the other hand, if the record is silent, then I say that the section should take effect. I think at this point, while I respect your Honor's thinking and recollection of your thinking, I think that the only proper practice and the germane way is to say, What does the record say, and I think the record is silent at this point, and if it is silent, then I would suggest that the defendant is entitled to credit, if his sentence is one of custody and I say one for which

Congress had in mind when they drafted this particular section.

So I think --

THE COURT: I see your point --

MR. WALES: -- I think we are really before you on two points:

Number 1 is does sentence of probation warrant it, or is the section ever applicable to sentence of probation and applicable say to sentence of imprisonment, which is as I see the issue. Your Honor on the other hand says, We have got to take into consideration what went on in the back of my mind when I did what I did.

THE COURT: No, I put that forward simply to show, as I say, that sentence was not inadvertent.

MR. WALES: I'm sure everything your Honor does is not inadvertent. I have too much respect for your Honor to believe that any of these things, especially sentencing where you are giving it consideration, obviously that is not going to be inadvertent.

I say the record doesn't substantiate -let us put it this way, the record does not repute ,
the position which I am advancing today, and I

think that I am entitled to have that issue resolved on the basis of the record and not something outside of the record.

THE COURT: Well, as I say, I don't accept that it is outside of the record.

MR. DOUGHERTY: My only comment, your Honor, and I will be frank to admit that on a brief and first reading of some of these sections that I have to express unfamiliarity with them, but if I understand Mr. Wales' position he seems to be reading into Section 3651 the requirement that the section does not mandate, namely that upon considering whether or not the public interest will be served and the ends of justice will be served by tracing a defendant on probation, the Court is also required to state with specificity the reason why it feels such a sentence serves the interests of justice and the public interest, and I don't think that Section 3651 places that burden upon a sentencing Court to do.

THE COURT: Well, it seems to me, Mr. Wales, the critical defect in your argument would be that it would absolutely mandate an abridged

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probation in every case in which the Court wished to have the defendant admitted to probation, largely in consideration of time served.

MR. WALES: You could have avoided that problem.

THE COURT: What.

problem, and that is where he had to be sentenced on two counts you gave him concurrent sentences on both counts, in other words if you had given him a prison sentence of let us say three and a half years on the first count, let it stay, and given him probation on the second count, then it wouldn't have been a problem --

circumstance of the specific case and not a general case with which the statutes have to deal. In other words what this comes down to is saying that maximum probation could not be imposed in any case in which the defendant had been held on a charge of which he is sentenced for any length of time for want of bail the Court would always have to impose a prison sentence to mop up that time, and having done so, would have exhausted its power to

grant probation.

MR. WALES: In a split sentence.

THE COURT: What.

MR. WALES: In a split sentence, that would solve that problem.

THE COURT: Well, no, it wouldn't, specifically it could solve only those cases in which the existing incarceration had not extended beyond six months.

MR. WALES: Well, of course, this statute has a limiting affect, if a District Judge wants to impose a maximum prison sentence, if he really feels that the defendant is entitled to a maximum prison sentence, he has this limiting factor there, too, but if the fellow has enough time in he is going to walk right out and there is nothing that the Judge can do about it. I think the same argument goes for probation as it goes for prison sentence.

THE COURT: Well, I dissent for the reason stated.

The motion is denied.

I will make an order on it so you can -MR. WALES: Is it possible, your Honor,

could your Honor write a little opinion, two, three sentences, maybe.

We are going to the Court of Appeals.

THE COURT: I think what we have done here is short and clear enough, it expresses my views fully and clearly.

There are no cases directly in point, so that Court will have to go to work.

HR. WALLS: Thank you, your Honor.

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A 201 Affidavit of Service by Mai				OTZ AFFELDIATE FAMILIES A
U.S. COURT OF APP	EALS:SECOND	CIRCUIT	\ In	dex No.
ALBANESK,	Petitioner-A	ppellant,		
	against		(A)	sidavit of Service by Mail
U.S.A.,	Appellee,		_)	
STATE OF NEW YORK, CO	UNTY OF NE	W YORK		ss.:
I, LAUREL	. N. H	496/NS.		being duly sworn,
deposes and says that deport 1050 CAR That upon the 25th day of	nent is not a part	ty to the action.	is over 18 ye .V. nent served	ears of age and resides at the annexed Appellant
Appendix.	ipon U.S. At	torney-koothax	n Eastern	District attorney(s) for
Appellee				a, Brooklyn, N.Y.
purpose by depositing a true	copy of same, e			by said attorney(s) for that ly ddressed wrapper in a

purpose by depositing a true copy of same, enclosed in a postpaid properly dedressed wrapper in a Post Office Official Depository under the exclusive care and custody of the United States Post Office Department, within the State of New York.

Swom to before me, this 28 day of March 19 March

Print name beneath signature

ROBERT T. BRIN AUC.

NO. 31 - 0418950

QUALIFIED IN NEW YORK COUNTY

COMMISSION EXPIRES MARCH 30, 1975

